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Abstract—eScience middleware frameworks integrating multi-
ple virtual organizations must incorporate comprehensive user
identity and access management solutions. In this paper we
examine usage patterns for these systems and map the patterns to
widely used security standards and approaches. We focus on sci-
ence gateways, a class of distributed system cyberinfrastructure.
Science gateways are end user environments that provide access
to a wide range of academic and commercial computing and
storage resources for virtual organizations. Successful gateways
focus on specific scientific communities and domains, but they
build on many reusable features that can be provided by general
purpose hosted platform services that can support multiple
tenants. Providing a security framework for identity and access
management for such hosted service removes the burden for each
gateway to handle its user identity management and control
access to its critical resources. From the resource provider’s
point of view, it provides a basis for more uniform accounting
and auditing. Challenges arise from the range of gateways (both
legacy and newly created), the range of technologies used to build
them, and the range of end user environments (Web, mobile,
desktop, and programmatic API clients) that gateways provide.
Using Apache Airavata as an implementation, we examine three
common gateway types based on where the user identity infor-
mation is held and how these can be treated in a unified manner
using OAuth2 and OpenID-Connect. Our solutions for identity
and access management are not specific to Apache Airavata but
can be generally applied to any e-Science platform.
Index Terms—science gateways, identity management, dis-
tributed systems security
I. INTRODUCTION
Science Gateways [1] [2] [3] [4] are user environments
and supporting services that help researchers make effective
and enhanced use of a diverse set of computing, storage, and
related resources. Gateways serve as Virtual Organizations,
brokering access for their users to a broad collection of
resources from different, often unaffiliated resource providers
including campus grids, national scale cyberinfrastructure,
and commercial cloud vendors. Thus, identity management,
authentication, and authorization are critical capabilities that a
gateway must provide.
Security management is one example of the general-purpose
features that underlie many domain specific gateways. An
important architectural trend is for gateways serving specific
Virtual Organizations to use hosted, general purpose platform
services. The goal of the Apache Airavata project [5] [6] is
to implement and integrate many of these general purpose
services into a common framework that can be run as a multi-
tenanted platform service that can support multiple gateways
simultaneously. In Apache Airavata, these services are imple-
mented by multiple components (see [5]) but are exposed
through a common API and a single, logical connection
point, the API Server. Here, we describe the design and
implementation needed to secure the interactions between a
gateway tenant and the Apache Airavata API Server.
Science gateway tenants to Apache Airavata services run
remotely and are typically under the control of the gate-
way provider. Gateway clients interact with Apache Airavata
through an Apache Thrift-based API. For an overview of
the API, see [6]. The Thrift-defined API and data models
allow Airavata to provide client SDKs in many programming
languages, including Java, PHP, Python and C++. These
SDKs manage over-the-wire communications. Our technical
challenge is to implement security features over the top
of these communications. We note an additional challenge:
gateways are not only Web-based but may also be desktop
or native mobile applications. They may also be embeddable
clients intended to be called directly from end-user scripts and
notebooks. This introduces a challenge since Airavata SDKs
are distributed directly to the end user’s device. We cannot
assume access is restricted behind a Web server.
In this paper, we discuss the design and implementation
of the solution for securing the Airavata API. This includes
authenticating and authorizing end users into the Airavata
API, based on different use cases that depend on the different
types of user identity management scenarios in gateways. The
primary contributions of this paper are identifying general
patterns for gateway identity management, mapping these pat-
terns to OAuth2 scenarios, and implementing these solutions.
We examine the implementation using three Apache Airavata
gateway clients.
We first identify three scenarios in which a gateway tenant
interacting with Airavata middleware may manage its users.
• Scenario 1: The gateway client does not have a user
store and will use Airavata infrastructure to provide user
management.
• Scenario 2: The gateway has a user store and in-house
identity management mechanisms. In this scenario, dif-
ferent gateways have different preferences on the level at
which they share user identity information. This is typical
of mature gateways.
• Scenario 3: The gateway authenticates users into the gate-
way using a federated identity provider such as InCom-
mon using mechanisms such as SAML SSO, OpenID,
and OAuth.
We must be able to provide a unified identity management
solution that can meet the requirements of the above scenarios
and provide proper Airavata API security that can be seam-
lessly adopted by all types of gateways including web based
and native (desktop and mobile) clients.
II. SOLUTION OVERVIEW
When devising a solution, one option that we considered
was to provide user authentication at the gateway layer using
the authentication protocol of the gateway’s choice, and use the
system-to-system authentication mechanism between the gate-
way and the Airavata server. Examples of two of the system-to-
system authentication mechanisms that can be used are mutual
authentication using SSL certificates and basic authentication
(i.e: Gateway credentials over TLS). The main drawback of
the certificate-based mutual authentication approach is that
it is not scalable from the management point of view. Each
gateway can have different types of applications (web, native),
and ideally each of these applications should have different
credentials. When the number of gateway clients increases,
management of gateway credentials and PKI infrastructure is
not scalable [7]. Also, both of these approaches can be used
only for web based gateways, where credentials or certificates
can be securely maintained in a web server. They are not
secure enough to be used in native clients as a malicious
user can reverse engineer the client and gain access to the
credentials/keys. One way to facilitate native clients using
these approaches is to route the requests from native clients
via a proxy server and establish the mutual trust between
the proxy server and Airavata using gateway credentials or
certificates. This requires extra effort from gateway developers
and requires end user information to be passed to the Airavata
API Server by the clients with every API request.
The solution we adopted is to use OAuth 2.0 based autho-
rization delegation [8] to the gateway by the user authenticated
at the gateway. The main advantage of this approach is
scalability. This approach does not require any management of
gateway credentials or PKI infrastructure. The OAuth access
tokens can be generated by a separate dedicated authorization
server and not by the API Server. This approach also benefits
from wider adoption in the general “Software as a Service”
and “Platform as a Service” communities to which science
gateways and gateway frameworks belong. OAuth 2.0 is the
de-facto standard for access delegation. It can be used in
conjunction with existing authentication protocols such as
SAML 2.0 based single sign on via the OAuth 2.0 extension
profiles. Even though OAuth is an authorization delegation
protocol, authentication of users can be done using OpenID-
Connect [9]. Hence OpenID-Connect + OAuth 2.0 can be used
as a comprehensive authentication and authorization protocol.
Figure 1 illustrates the high level architecture of the solution
with mappings to the standard OAuth 2.0 based authorization-
delegation solution architecture. Because OAuth 2.0 and re-
lated technologies are widely adopted, we chose to integrate
a third party implementation rather than develop it ourselves.
Our solution makes use of the identity management features
offered by WSO2 Identity Server (IS) [10]. WSO2 IS is
a widely used open source (Apache V2 License) identity
management system that provides out-of-the-box support for
many identity management standards such as OAuth/OpenID,
SAML SSO, XACML, and features such as multi-factor au-
thentication, password policies, etc. It supports multi-tenancy,
per-tenant user store configuration, and custom pluggable user
store manager extensions, all of which are relevant to the
problems discussed in this paper.
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Fig. 1. High level overview of the solution
Details of the interactions illustrated in Figure 1 are as
follows.
0) User is authenticated to Airavata. This paper examines
three specific scenarios.
1) OAuth token is obtained from the WSO2 IS to access
the Airavata API on behalf of the authenticated user.
2) Requests to Airavata, depending on the actions the user
wants to perform, are sent along with the obtained
OAuth token.
3) Each request sent to the Airavata API Server is autho-
rized by the Security Manager. The Security Manager
acts as a client within Airavata to various WSO2 IS and
other potentially services. First the attached OAuth token
is validated and user’s profile information is retrieved.
Then the request is authorized; authorization approaches
include role-based or group based decisions.
4) Only the authorized requests are allowed to reach the
Airavata API.
Authorization decisions for subsequent requests from the same
user are handled using caching to avoid contacting WSO2
IS for every call. This step can use different authorization
mechanisms, such as role determination using XACML capa-
bilities of IS or group membership via Grouper. The above
solution supports multi-tenancy; when the user identity is
exchanged, it includes the tenant domain that the user belongs
to so that the authentication and authorization are performed
with respect to that tenant domain in WSO2 IS. The same
client side logic to authenticate a user and obtain an OAuth
token can be implemented in web, desktop and mobile clients
using the recommended grant types available in the OAuth 2.0
specification.
III. SOLUTION IN DETAIL
A. Authenticating & Obtaining an OAuth 2.0 Access Token
User authentication and obtaining an access token by the
client application (Step 0 and Step 1 in Figure 1) are the only
steps in the high level solution that differ among the three
scenarios that we identified. OAuth 2.0 specifies five grant
types to obtain an access token by the client app. Each of
these grant types serves a different purpose and is used in a
different way. We evaluate each and discuss their applicability
to our gateway client scenarios.
The Authorization Code grant type is the recommended
grant type to be used if the client application is capable of
spawning a web browser to redirect the user to the autho-
rization server’s authentication page. The user signs in to the
authorization server and authorizes the gateway application to
obtain an access token for the user. This authorization is a one-
time-only application authorization. If the authorization server
authorizes the request, the user will be redirected back to the
client with a token (called the authorization code) in the query
string, which the client application will capture and exchange
for an access token in the background. In order to use this
grant type, the application itself should already be trusted by
the authorization server through some application registration
process. This is applicable for standard Web-based gateway
tenants.
The Implicit grant type is very similar to the Authentication
Code grant type. The difference is that the access token is
directly returned to the client application after the user signs
in for Implicit grants. Implicit grants are for clients that are
not capable of keeping the client application’s own credentials
secret. An example scenario is a thick browser client that uses
JavaScript to directly access the Apache Airavata API methods
rather than going through an intermediate Web server.
If the user (resource owner) already trusts the client applica-
tion to provide his/her own credentials, the Authorization Code
grant type is not needed. Resource Owner Password grant type
is an alternative that can be used to simplify the flow in this
case. This grant type is useful in scenarios where the client
application cannot spawn a web browser; examples include
desktop and mobile client applications. In this grant type
instead of redirecting the user to the authorization server’s au-
thentication page, the client application itself obtains the user
credentials and then sends these to the authorization server
along with the client’s own credentials. If the authentication
is successful then the client will be issued an access token.
The Client Credential grant type is similar to the Resource
Owner Password grant except the client application’s creden-
tials are used to authenticate a request for an access token. This
grant type should only be used by trusted clients. This grant
is suitable for machine-to-machine authentication that involves
no user interaction or user authorization. In this grant type we
do not need to use OpenID-Connect to authenticate users.
Authorization servers that support Refresh Code grant types
are able to issue a refresh token when they return an access
token to a client application. When the access token expires,
the client can use the refresh token to retrieve a new access
token with the same permissions. The client has to maintain
the state of each token. This can be done by either periodically
using the active refresh token or by using the refresh token to
acquire a new token after an access failure.
B. Science Gateway Client Scenarios
We now map the general OAuth2 solutions to three different
gateway identity management scenarios. All solutions use the
Security Manager component within Apache Airavata (see
Figure 1) that acts as a client to various WSO2 IS services.
1) The gateway doesn’t have a user store and would like to
depend on Airavata to provide user management features: The
gateway application makes use of the Airavata Client SDK to
create users, which in turn invokes the User Admin API of
the WSO2 IS; see Figure 2. When users are authenticated
to the gateway, their credentials are validated against those
stored in the WSO2 IS user store. The gateway uses Airavata’s
client SDK to authenticate users and obtain OAuth access
tokens using OpenID-Connect. All the client applications are
provided by the gateway itself and no user generated or
third party applications need to connect to Airavata. Thus
all gateway client applications can be considered as trusted
clients, and therefore instead of Authorization Code grant type
we use the Resource Owner Password grant type to obtain
access tokens for both web and native clients. If the web
application is a browser application that directly interacts with
the Airavata API through a JavaScript SDK, the Implicit grant
type should be used instead and privileges of access token
obtained by this grant type should be highly restricted.
2) The gateway has its own user-store and identity manage-
ment mechanisms: Here we consider three solution categories
to address this scenario based on the differences in preference
of the gateway to share user identity information with Airavata.
In the first category, the gateway will not share any information
about the end user’s identity and will use Airavata only as a
job execution engine. Therefore the gateway client will obtain
an OAuth access token by authenticating to the WSO2 IS.
The Client Credential grant type is the appropriate type for
this case. After retrieving an access token, end user requests
to Airavata attach this token (see Figure 3). In this case the
types of gateway applications that can be supported are limited
to web based gateways where the client credentials can be
securely maintained in the web server. For native (JavaScript
Fig. 2. Gateway uses Airavata-provided user store
and desktop) client gateways that fall in this category, the
requests should be sent through an intermediary proxy server
that can securely maintain the client credentials.
Fig. 3. Gateway does not share any user identity information with Airavata
In the second category, the gateway shares user identity
information but does not allow Airavata to connect to the
gateway’s user store. User accounts need to be provisioned
with the identity information required by Airavata. In this
case the gateway uses Airavata’s identity provisioning SDK
client to provision user accounts to Airavata’s identity manager
(i.e WSO2 IS) at the time of user creation in the gateway.
Already created user accounts in the gateway user store can
be provisioned through a bootstrapping phase. Invoking the
Airavata SDK for user provisioning will in turn invoke the
System for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM) [11]
endpoint in WSO2 IS for identity provisioning. This enables
the execution flow of accessing the Airavata API to be the
same as in Scenario 1; see Figure 4. In this category user
information will be duplicated in both the gateway user store
and the WSO2 IS user store. It is the responsibility of the
gateway to maintain them in coherence.
In the third category, the gateway allows Airavata to connect
to its organizational user store in read-only mode. In this case,
the identity manager of Airavata (i.e WSO2 IS), is connected
to the gateway’s organizational user store through the user
store manager extension provided by the WSO2 IS. This
Fig. 4. Gateway provisions user accounts to the Airavata provided user store
enables the user authentication, access token retrieval, and the
rest of the execution flow for accessing the Airavata API to
be the same as in scenario 1; see Figure 5. The WSO2 IS
distribution by default provides user store manager extensions
that can be used to integrate Active Directory and LDAP based
user stores. Custom user store manager extensions can be
written to integrate any custom user store, such as a database.
Fig. 5. Gateway allows Airavata to have read only access to the organizational
user store
3) The science gateway does not have a user store but
instead authenticates users into the gateway using a third
party federated identity provider: In this scenario the gateway
becomes a relying party, and it needs to authenticate users to
Airavata through the federated authentication mechanism that
is being used in the gateway community. To solve this issue,
we used the inbound authentication configuration feature in
WSO2 IS. Using this feature, it is possible to plug external
federated authentication providers as inbound authentication
providers to a user store. Out of the box, WSO2 IS supports
OpenID, SAML, OAuth2/OpenID-Connect, WS Federation,
Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and Facebook federated authenti-
cation providers. For a federated authentication protocol not
in the previous list, it is possible to plug in a custom inbound
authentication provider.
If the federated authentication protocol supports retrieval of
the user’s identity attributes from the identity provider (such as
SAML, OpenID), a user account is created in WSO2 IS with
this identity information using just-in-time provisioning. When
a user tries to authenticate to WSO2 IS, the user can select the
configured identity provider and login to that provider. Once
the user is authenticated via the federated identity management
protocol, an OAuth access token is generated in WSO2 IS
that has access to the Airavata API, and the rest of the flow
of execution continues in the same way as in other cases;
see Figure 6. Since federated authenticators typically support
only web-based access, a web based OAuth 2.0 grant type
such as Authorization Code grant is appropriate. In the case
of thick web clients, Implicit grant type should be used. Native
clients are now required to spawn an embedded browser for
user authentication and extract the access token.
Fig. 6. Gateway uses federated identity provider.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Every Apache Airavata API method definition was changed
to incorporate a mandatory field named AuthzToken, which
contains the OAuth access token and the Airavata tenant ID
information that is set at the gateway client layer. To process
this token, we added the new Security Manager component
to the Airavata API Server. This new component is designed
to be pluggable so that we can change it if required without
affecting the rest of Airavata. The Security Manager intercepts
all API requests and validates them from the separately hosted
WSO2 Identity Server, which acts as the Authorization Server
for Airavata. For intercepting the API requests the Security
Manager uses annotations supported by the Google Guice
library.
Authorization validation at the Security Manager is a two
step process. First the OAuth access token is validated by
calling the OAuth token validator endpoint in WSO2 IS, and
then any authorization policy is enforced. When invoking
these endpoints, the requests need to be authenticated using
HTTP basic authentication by providing the respective tenant’s
admin credentials in WSO2 IS. Therefore, Airavata needs to
know and store the respective credentials for IS tenants. For
this we used Airavata’s credential store server [12]. Gateway
administrators can store their IS tenant credentials by updating
the GatewayProfile object in Airavata.
Ideally, every Airavata API request should be validated
against the WSO2 IS as shown in Step 3 in Figure 1. However,
we found that this imposes a significant performance overhead
(about 350 ms) on the Airavata API method latency. To
overcome this issue we added an authorization cache module
into the Security Manager that caches the authorization deci-
sions for each access token-tenant-API method combination
after successful validation from WSO2 IS. Subsequent API
requests to the API Server from the same user are checked
in the authorization cache instead of directly invoking the IS
validation endpoints. The caching duration of each authoriza-
tion decision is set to the remaining valid duration of the
corresponding OAuth access token, which can be obtained
from the OAuth token validation response. This OAuth token
validation response contains various user attributes such as
username and email that are also cached.
We have implemented the designs described here to support
several science gateway tenants to Apache Airavata. The
SEAGrid science gateway [13] is an example of a Scenario
1 tenant. SEAGrid uses a MySQL database as the user
store in WSO2 IS and provides a web based gateway and a
desktop client. Both of these clients use the Resource Owner
Password grant type in OAuth 2.0 specification to authenticate
users and retrieve access tokens as both are trusted clients.
Another client is a USDA-funded science gateway, currently
under development by a collaborating team, for accessing
bioinformatics applications. This client needs to integrate the
user management with the existing user store. Thus this falls
to the Category 3 of Scenario 2 in our taxonomy. The USDA
user store is an LDAP server, and hence it was straightforward
to integrate with IS. This gateway is web-based, so a Resource
Owner Password grant type is used for authentication and
access token retrieval. The UltraScan science gateway [14]
provides its own user store and does not share any user
information with Airavata. Thus, it is a Category 1, Scenario 2
gateway in our taxonomy. As described in the solution section,
the Client Credential grant type is used to retrieve an access
token that is used to submit API requests to Airavata.
V. RELATED WORK
Science gateway security, especially the aspect of user
credential management for individual gateways, is a well
studied area. One approach is to support end-to-end single
sign on for users. Whenever a gateway user submits a job
to a remote compute resource, the gateway middleware uses
that particular user’s credentials on the remote host for au-
thentication. Per user grid certificates, MyProxy and various
MyProxy services such as OAuth for MyProxy [15], CILogon
for MyProxy, and the MyProxy Gateway are implementations
of this approach [16]. Security Assertion Markup Language
based Single-Sign-On (SAML SSO) is used by the MoSGrid
science [17].
The per-user credential mechanism can be difficult to op-
erate in practice. The Authentication, Authorization, Auditing
and Accounting (AAAA) model [18] is an alternative; XSEDE
uses a simplified version of this model in production. The main
idea of the AAAA model is to adopt community user accounts
and avoid using per user credentials to authenticate to the
remote resources. This significantly reduces the effort required
for user management tasks in compute resources as now there
are a limited number of science gateway community accounts.
This approach outsources gateway user management tasks
to the gateway layer itself. In this model, multiple gateway
users share the same community account to submit jobs to
compute resources. Within Airavata, community credentials
are managed by the credential store component [12].
Globus Nexus [19] is very similar to WSO2 IS. It is a
“platform as a service” application that provides user identity
management, profile management, and group management
features. Its identity management capabilities allow users to
create a unique Globus identity that can be associated with
federated external identities from campus identity providers
(e.g CILogon), computing resource identity providers (XSEDE
accounts using MyProxy OAuth), and commercial identity
providers such as Google. This Globus Identity can be con-
sumed by subscribing applications using an OAuth-based
workflow to create a Single-Sign-On environment. Globus
Nexus is a hosted service, whereas WSO2 IS is downloadable,
open source software that is also available as a for-fee service.
This difference introduces tradeoffs that gateways and gateway
platform service providers should consider.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper examines the over-the-wire access patterns that
exist between a wide range of gateway clients and multi-
tenanted platform services like Apache Airavata and how they
can be mapped to OAuth2 protocol and OpenID-Connect.
This paper does not cover fine-grained authorization decisions.
These can be implemented either as roles or as groups; our
current implementation uses XACML role expressions within
WSO2 IS to encode and enforce roles associated with different
API calls. We are currently comparing this approach with
group-based approaches that can be implemented using open
source Grouper software.
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